Writing Veterans’ History:A Conversation on the Twentieth Century by Huxford, Grace et al.
                          Huxford, G., Alcalde, Á., Baines, G., Burtin , O., & Edele, M. (2019).
Writing Veterans’ History: A Conversation on the Twentieth Century.
War and Society, 38(2), 115-138.
https://doi.org/10.1080/07292473.2019.1566978
Peer reviewed version
Link to published version (if available):
10.1080/07292473.2019.1566978
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the author accepted manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available online
via Taylor & Francis at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07292473.2019.1566978 . Please refer to
any applicable terms of use of the publisher.
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the





Writing Veterans’ History: a Conversation on the Twentieth Century  
Grace Huxford*a, Ángel Alcaldeb, Gary Bainesc, Olivier Burtind, Mark Edelee 
a Historical Studies Department, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK; bCenter for the 
History of Global Development, Shanghai University, China; cHistory Department, 
Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa; dDepartment of History, Princeton 
University, Princeton, USA; e School of Historical and Philosophical Studies, The 
University of Melbourne, Parkville, Australia 
*corresponding author, grace.huxford@bristol.ac.uk  
 
Authors 
• Grace Huxford (corresponding author), University of Bristol 
Address: Department of Historical Studies, University of Bristol, 13 Woodland 
Road, BS8 1TB, United Kingdom.  
Email address: grace.huxford@bristol.ac.uk 
Biography: Dr. Grace Huxford is Lecturer in 19/20th Century British History at 
the University of Bristol. She is author of The Korean War in Britain: 
Citizenship Selfhood and Forgetting (Manchester University Press, 2018) and 
has written articles on modern British social and cultural history in journals 
including Twentieth Century British History, Oral History and Life Writing. She 
is currently conducting an oral history of British military communities in 
Germany after the Second World War. She is was formerly Research Fellow in 
Oral History at the University of Warwick.  
 
• Ángel Alcalde 
Address: Center for the History of Global Development, Shanghai University, 
99 Shangda Rd. Baoshan, Shanghai, China 200444 
Email address: angel.alcalde@eui.eu  
Biography: Ángel Alcalde obtained his PhD in History and Civilization from the 
European University Institute. He has recently been a Humboldt Postdoctoral 
Fellow at LMU Munich, and a visiting scholar at Shanghai University. He 
specializes in the social and cultural history of war, transnational and global 
history, and the history of fascism. He was published numerous works on the 
Spanish Civil War and the Franco regime. His latest monograph, War Veterans 
and Fascism in Interwar Europe, was published by Cambridge University Press 







• Gary Baines 
Address: History Department, Rhodes University, New Arts Building, Artillery 
Road, Grahamstown, 6140, South Africa 
Email address: g.baines@ru.ac.za 
Biography: Professor Gary Baines is Head of the Rhodes University History 
Department. He is the author of South Africa’s ‘Border War’: Contested 
Narratives and Conflicting Memories (Bloomsbury, 2014) and co-editor of 
Beyond the Border War: New Perspectives on Southern Africa’s Late Cold War 
Conflicts (Unisa Press, 2008). Apart these works and other pieces in the field of 
war studies, he has published book chapters and articles on the apocalyptic 
imagination, urban history, and public history, as well as on South African 
literature, music and film.  
• Olivier Burtin, Princeton University 
Address: Department of History, Princeton University, 129 Dickinson Hall, 
Princeton, New Jersey, 08544-1017, USA. 
Email address: oburtin@princeton.edu 
Biography: Dr. Olivier Burtin a Lecturer in the Department of History at 
Princeton University. His research has been published in the Journal of Policy 
History. He is currently at work on a book manuscript about the role of U.S. 
veterans’ groups in the creation of a separate welfare state for former soldiers in 
the mid-twentieth century. 
 
• Mark Edele  
Address: School of Historical and Philosophical Studies, Arts West Building, 
The University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria 3010, Australia 
Email address: medele@unimelb.edu.au 
Biography: Professor Mark Edele is Hansen Chair in History at The University 
of Melbourne as well as an Australian Research Council Future Fellow. His 
publications include Soviet Veterans of the Second World War (2008), Stalinist 
Society (2011), Stalin’s Defectors (2017), Shelter from the Holocaust: 
Rethinking Jewish Survival in the Soviet Union (with Atina Grossmann and 
Sheila Fitzpatrick, 2017), and The Soviet Union. A Short History (2018). He is 
currently working on three books: a historiography of Stalinism, a history of 




Disclosure Statement: There are no conflict of interests in the publication of this 
article.  
 




Writing Veterans’ History: a Conversation on the Twentieth Century 
  
 Abstract: This article is a conversation between five specialists of  veterans' 
 history on the current direction of the field and its importance to  the study of 
 war and society. The discussants offer an an overview of current methodologies, 
 definitions and historiographical approaches. Concentrating on the experiences 
 of twentieth- century veterans (particularly after 1945) and using a diverse range 
 of case studies from across the world, this article also asks what connections 
 bound veteran  communities together, and how we as historians might 
 conceptualise veterans: as a class, as a collective, or as a far looser grouping of 
 individuals? Finally, this article explores what distinguishes veteranhood after 
 1945 and the evolving relationship between veterans and the memory of 
 conflict.   
Keywords: veteran; associations; brutalization; victimhood; agency; memory 
 
This conversation first began at a 2017 international workshop at Ludwig-Maximilian-
Universität (LMU), Munich, organised by Ángel Alcalde and Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, on 
the topic of the history of war veterans after 1945 and their interaction with wider social 
movements, Cold War politics and decolonization.1 At this conference, it became evident 
that veterans’ history was a dynamic and source-rich area of research, but also one that 
continued to grapple with issues around definitions, methodologies and scope. This 
roundtable discussion is thus designed to summarise the state of veterans’ history, but 
also to stimulate further debate on the figure of the veteran in the social, political and 
global histories of modern conflict.  
This conversation concentrates on the history of veterans in the twentieth century, 
focusing specifically (though not exclusively) on their experiences after 1945. As Olivier 
Burtin points out below, the historically unprecedented number of veterans across the 
world during that period means not just that veterans occupy a significant place in modern 
history but that they are also a vital lens through which to analyse the changing 
relationship between war and society. Another important point that became evident in the 
course of this discussion is the complexity of the subject itself, as the temporal reach of 
                                                          
1 Á. Alcalde and X. M. Núñez Seixas, eds., War Veterans and the World after 1945: Cold War Politics, 




veterans’ history is complex: while veteranhood is predicated on past activity, it is also 
underwritten by present-centred and future-focused concerns around status, recognition, 
benefits, and commemoration.  
The discussion is purposefully transnational in scope, incorporating the views of 
historians with a wide range of geographical and methodological interests. As several 
discussants note, the study of veterans can be deeply enriched by comparative or 
transnational approaches, although carrying out such research is not without its 
challenges. The conversation is led by Grace Huxford, a British social historian, with 
expertise on Britain and the Korean War (1950-3). Joining her are: Ángel Alcalde, a 
transnational historian with expertise on veterans’ organisations; Gary Baines, a historian 
of South African history, memory and war studies, specialising in the representation and 
remembrance of the South African Border War (1966-89); Olivier Burtin, a political 
historian of the modern United States, with particular interests in U.S. veterans, social 
movements and the state; and Mark Edele, a historian of the Soviet Union with expertise 
on Soviet veterans of the Second World War and who, together with Martin Crotty and 
Neil Diamant, is currently writing a global history of veterans.  
Our conversation begins with a characterisation of the field at the present moment 
and common methodologies for examining veterans’ history, before moving on to 
discussing definitional issues of who constitutes a veteran in modern history. We then 
debated questions such as how to group veterans, what connections bound veteran 
communities together, and how we as historians might conceptualise veterans: as a class, 
as a collective, or as a far looser grouping of diverse individuals? We conclude the 
discussion by examining the post-1945 period in particular depth and reflecting again on 
the interaction between veterans and memory. Whilst this conversation is inevitably 
unable to cover all the facets of modern veterans’ history, it poses several important 
questions for historians of war and society, not least asking whether there is anything 
truly distinctive about veterans’ history in the larger context of modern warfare. As noted 
below, veterans do not have a monopoly on war experience, but they constitute a vital 




[Grace Huxford]: One of the aims of this conversation is to understand the characteristics 




methodologies which underpin the field. It seems sensible to start then by defining the 
field to date. Which sub-fields do you feel define veterans’ history as a research field? 
 
[Ángel Alcalde]: Sometimes historians work on a specific sub-field of their discipline 
without being fully aware of the greater thematic implications and intersections of their 
research and I think this problem applies clearly to the case of veterans’ history. Most 
often, historians working on veterans primarily remain specialists in a period, region or 
country. In my view though, there are three different broad sub-fields in veterans’ history: 
the political, the social, and the cultural. First, historians working on veteran politics are 
most interested in the historical and political role of associations and organizations.2 
Second, a social history approach to veterans’ history has enhanced the stories of disabled 
veterans, pensions, rehabilitation and reintegration.3 Third, the cultural history of modern 
war has focused intensively on the construction and dissemination of veterans’ memory.4 
The most important historiographical contributions to veterans’ history, such as Antoine 
Prost's three-volume book on interwar French veterans, focus on all three aspects.5 
However, this three-fold description is somewhat artificial, as history in general, and 
veterans’ history in particular, does not respect such neat categorisation. Indeed, beyond 
these sub-fields, I would also identify specific themes that form the core of veterans’ 
history as a research field, such as demobilization.6 Yet veterans’ demobilization 
processes can in turn be analysed from a political, social and cultural perspective.  
 
[Olivier Burtin:] I do not think that veterans’ history is necessarily different from any 
other field, but some themes are certainly more recurrent than others. Like Ángel, three 
                                                          
2 C. Millington, From Victory to Vichy: Veterans in Inter-War France (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2016); N. Barr, The Lion and the Poppy: British Veterans, Politics, and Society, 1921-
1939 (Westport: Praeger, 2005). 
3 J. Bourke,  Dismembering the Male: Men’s Bodies, Britain and the Great War (London: Reaktion 
Books, 1996); D. Cohen, The War Come Home: Disabled Veterans in Britain and Germany, 1914-1939 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). 
4 K.A. Hass, Carried to the Wall: American Memory and the Vietnam Veterans Memorial (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1998); Patrick Hagopian, The Vietnam War in American Memory: 
Veterans, Memorials, and the Politics of Healing (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2009). 
5 A. Prost, Les Anciens Combattants et la Société Française, 1914–1939 (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 
1977). ). I followed this three-fold model in Á. Alcalde, Los excombatientes franquistas: la cultura de 
guerra del fascismo español y la Delegación Nacional de Excombatientes (1936-1965) (Zaragoza: 
Prensas de la Universidad de Zaragoza, 2014). 





sub-fields come to my mind, although they are different in scope and certainly not an 
exhaustive list: disability (the study of how veterans and civilians deal with war-
connected ailments),7 social policy (the study of veterans’ benefits, such as pensions or 
healthcare),8 and war memory (the study of memorials, commemorations, war literature, 
history textbooks, and so on).9 Of course, these themes can and often do overlap. 
 
[Grace Huxford]: The connections with disability history, highlighted by both Olivier and 
Ángel, certainly resonate in the British context. For instance, Deborah Cohen’s 
comparative history, The War Come Home, examines the different political and social 
experiences of disabled veterans in Britain and Germany in the interwar period. This 
moment collided with the crystallisation of the conflict’s legacy and memory: the focus 
on injured bodies at the time later fed the growing narrative of the First World War as a 
‘bad war’. Broken and damaged masculinity fits well within that narrative and reinforces 
many of its assumptions. As Nigel Hunt has commented, from 1980s, there has been an 
expectation that those who have fought in conflict are damaged or changed by it.10 
However, I would also add that there is a growing sense of dissatisfaction with this 
reading of veterans simply as ‘problems’ for the state and society after war, from critical 
military theorists as well as historians of disability. Sarah Bulmer and David Jackson 
argue that interpreting the veteran as only a ‘broken’ or diminished figure skews our 
understanding of veteran life.11 In this way, as Olivier points out, it is vital not to study 
these sub-themes in isolation or to let them characterise our approaches to veterans’ 
history.  
 
[Gary Baines]: I’d like to go back to Ángel’s point on the geographical focus of veterans’ 
history. While Ángel is correct to say that most historians who write about military 
veterans approach the subject as country or period specialists, I think that there is much 
value in adopting a transnational perspective. There is no doubt that veterans from all 
belligerent countries would have had similar difficulties in adjusting to civilian life in the 
                                                          
7 D.A. Gerber, ed., Disabled Veterans in History (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000). 
8 T. Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1992). 
9 D.W. Blight, Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press 
of Harvard University Press, 2001). 
10 N. Hunt, Memory, War and Trauma (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 123.  
11 S. Bulmer and D. Jackson, ‘“You Do Not Live in My Skin”: Embodiment, Voice and the Veteran’, 




aftermath of, say, the First World War. So certain comparisons might be made about the 
postwar experiences of such veterans. But, equally, I think that useful insights might be 
gleaned from the study of the veteran experience across periods and geographies. So, for 
instance, I believe that my study of the ‘afterlife’ of the ‘Border War’ in which South 
African Defence Force (SADF) soldiers were deployed in Namibia and Angola during 
the 1970s and 1980s, was enriched by consulting literature on the legacies of other 
conflicts.12 For my purposes, the study of veterans who fought in ‘lost wars’, especially 
the German Wehrmacht, the French in Algeria, and the Americans in Vietnam, proved 
valuable. 
One of the themes that veterans of defeated armies have in common is a sense of 
victimhood. Veterans frequently feel betrayed or ‘stabbed in the back’ and riddled with 
guilt after being on the losing side. On the other hand, veterans are seldom held to account 
for breaches in the codes that govern the rules of war and so answer for their conduct on 
account of cover ups by the military hierarchy or a failure of political elites to uphold 
justice. Instead, many veterans tend to blame other parties and to claim victimisation. Jay 
Winter contends that soldiers joined the ranks of victims as a result of the blurring of the 
distinction between soldiers and civilian victims, and that this probably occurred during 
and after the Vietnam War.13 If all soldiers, irrespective of whether they were conscripted 
or involved in waging unjust wars, are labelled victims then there is a very real danger of 
minimising their agency. I have gone as far as to argue that Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD) sometimes serves as an alibi for the perpetration of abuses by SADF 
veterans.14 This is not to deny that significant numbers of these veterans were traumatised 
but to suggest that they and medical professionals sometimes invoked the discourse of 
trauma in mitigation of gross human rights violations. While there is invariably a thin line 
between perpetrators and victims, this discourse tends to collapse these distinctions 
altogether. But it also suggests that the category of victim is not merely psychological, 
and can also have political, social and ethical dimensions.15 This tends to be overlooked 
when veterans are treated as unqualified victims. 
 
                                                          
12 G. Baines, South Africa’s ‘Border War’: Contested Narratives and Conflicting Memories (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2014). 
13 J. Winter, War Beyond Words: Languages of Remembrance from the Great War to the Present 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 66-67. 
14 Baines, 81-87. 




[Mark Edele]: In addition to the broad approaches (political, social, and cultural history 
of veterans) and the themes already mentioned (demobilization, reintegration, 
victimization, and memory) I would add ‘brutalization’ and ‘political struggle’ as 
problematics that define our field of study. The study of veterans and ‘brutalization’ has 
two aspects. Some scholars, most famously George Mosse, have construed veterans as 
major actors in the brutalization of entire societies and their politics.16 More recent 
research has questioned this assumption: not only do only a minority of veterans become 
violent political actors, but cases of post-war brutalization of politics are the exception 
rather than the rule.17 Others have asked if, and under what conditions, individuals return 
from war brutalized, and again differentiated answers have been proposed.18 Both 
versions of brutalization – the individual and the collective – are connected in intricate 
ways with the final field of study which Ángel mentioned at the start of this conversation: 
veterans’ politics. By this term I mean not just the history of veterans’ organizations but 
the wider question of whether and under what conditions veterans form a social group, a 
collective political actor. When and how can veterans claim a special status in postwar 
society? This is a question Martin Crotty, Neil Diamant, and myself attempt to answer in 
an ongoing book project on the comparative history of veterans.  
 
[Ángel Alcalde]: Certainly, the debate on Mosse’s ‘brutalization’ theory has shaped most 
scholarship on inter-war veterans in Europe since the 1990s, so it is very pertinent that 
Mark raises this point. The debate on brutalization has produced no consensus, probably 
because of the ambiguity inherent to Mosse’s notion. Indeed, in my analysis of the 
relationship between veterans and fascism, I opted to change the terms of this debate and 
offer alternative explanations based on different concepts, such as stereotyping and 
myth.19 As Mark is suggesting, I would emphasize that veteran politics cannot be reduced 
                                                          
16 G. Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars (New York, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1990). 
17 For a comparison of case studies from the First World War see M. Edele and R. Gerwarth (eds.), ‘The 
Limits of Demobilization’, special issue of Journal of Contemporary History 50, 1 (2015); for the Soviet 
case after the Second World War see M. Edele and F. Slaveski, ‘Violence from Below: Explaining 
Crimes against Civilians across Soviet Space, 1943–1947’, Europe-Asia Studies 68, 6 (2016), 1020-35. 
18 J. Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing: Face to Face Killing in 20th Century Warfare (New York: 
Basic Books, 1999). 





to the issue of ‘brutalization’ (generally meaning political violence and paramilitarism); 
it is a much richer field of inquiry.  
 
[Grace Huxford]: From our very first question then, it is clear that recent veterans’ history 
writing has been underpinned by a number of sub-fields, but that these sub-fields are 
potentially problematic, overemphasising particular themes at the expense of broader 
comparative approaches. This characterisation of the field leads me to my next question: 
what research methodologies are best suited to studying veterans’ history? Are there 
specific methodologies that define veterans’ history writing?  
 
[Olivier Burtin]: I am not sure that veterans’ history has specific research methods, as it 
is vast enough to accommodate a wide range of different approaches. Historians 
interested in how individual veterans went through war and transitioned to the postwar 
can look at letters, photographs, novels, memoirs, diaries, interviews, and material 
culture, while those focusing on the macro-level dynamics of veterans’ groups or 
veterans’ legislation can look at more traditional documents like newsletters, newspapers, 
congressional publications, and so on. As always, the sources we use depend on the kind 
of story we want to tell. 
 
[Ángel Alcalde]: I completely agree: methodology depends on the kind of hypothesis and 
research questions, as well as on the available evidence. In principle, as Olivier notes, any 
methodology is legitimate. In order to understand veterans’ identity, I personally found 
anthropological theories very insightful. Eric J. Leed, a cultural historian of the First 
World War, explained the veterans’ war experience as a rite of passage.20 But with this 
anthropological perspective there is a certain danger of essentialism. Some concepts 
borrowed from social and political sciences are illuminating for historians too, such as 
the current notion of DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration), widely used 
by agencies dealing with postwar recovery in current post-conflict states such as 
Mozambique or Liberia. This notion of DDR might also help understand veterans’ 
demobilization after the First World War. From a more practical point of view, if one is 
interested in veteran politics, archival material from veterans’ associations is usually 
                                                          





indispensable, but in its absence other archival and published sources (for example, 
periodicals and state archives) can be useful. The processes of rehabilitation of disabled 
veterans have traditionally left a great amount of written sources, thus allowing historians 
to conduct very detailed analyses. Memoirs and, where possible, oral history seem crucial 
to understand veterans’ memory. 
 
[Grace Huxford]: Yes, I would argue that oral history is a crucial research methodology 
for veterans’ history. In the UK, oral history emerged as a research methodology 
intimately tied to both community history and the reminiscence movement (the use of life 
narratives to promote well-being among older people).21 Given the varying, but persistent 
relevance of ‘community’ to veterans, it seems a highly appropriate methodology through 
which to understand the composition of veteran groups and the changing memory of past 
conflict among them. The insights from the reminiscence movement also give direction 
in interviewing, collaborating with, and empowering older generations.22 To be sure, oral 
history is not without its problems: the often-cited issues with memory distortion and 
anecdotes are valid, but perhaps of more importance is the contentious issue of 
community oral history itself. As Alistair Thomson has argued, oral history projects can 
be empowering for excluded groups, but potentially also conceal tensions around issues 
such as race or ‘awkward and taboo memories’.23 There is also a tendency to equate oral 
history with allowing veterans to ‘speak for themselves’ or to see it as a demonstration of 
agency. Even as an oral historian myself I would err away from the view that oral history 
is in and of itself always empowering. We should therefore approach it with care as a 
method for understanding veterans’ history.  
 
[Mark Edele]: I also do not see a specific method for the history of veterans. Depending 
on the questions asked and the sources available, any type of historical methodology 
might prove useful. In my original work on Soviet veterans I tried to use as catholic an 
approach to sources and methods as I could, although I was more interested in some 
aspects than in others. In Ángel's terms, the result was a social and political history of 
                                                          
21 A. Thomson, ‘Oral History and Community History in Britain: Personal and Critical Reflections on 
Twenty-Five Years of Continuity and Change’, Oral History, 36, 1 (2008), 95-104; L. Abrams, Oral 
History Theory (London: Routledge, 2010), 158-9.    
22 J. Bornat, ‘Oral History as a Social Movement: Reminiscence and Older People’, Oral History, 17, 2 
(1989), 16-20.   




Soviet Second World War veterans.24 Their cultural history and the changing memory of 
war – which others had explored before me – played a lesser role in my study.25 This 
focus on the social and the political had some effects on what kind of research I did. After 
a few trial runs, I eventually abandoned oral history, because the questions I was 
interested in could be answered more precisely and more quickly with archival and library 
research. Had I been more interested in memory, I would probably have done more oral 
history. More recently, my work has been comparative and collaborative, an attempt to 
put the Soviet experience further into a global context while simultaneously enriching the 
comparative history of veterans by integrating the Soviet example. Other historians of 
Soviet society went the opposite path, producing important local studies of veterans' 
reintegration and the construction of memory.26 Both approaches – to go comparative and 
global and to go focused and local – strike me as legitimate research strategies. They 
illuminate different aspects of a complex reality.  
 
[Gary Baines]: My own work has been influenced primarily by the ‘cultural turn’ in war 
studies and the emerging field of memory studies. The cultural studies approach to war 
is almost, by definition, interdisciplinary. It borrows insights from the study of history, 
linguistics, literature, performance and visual culture, memory, political and international 
relations, psychology, and so on. It owes as much to the influence of scholars who write 
about how war is represented by society’s elites and literati, as it does to those concerned 
with the common soldiers’ experience and witness of war. My focus is on cultural history 
and cultural production that shapes the experience, representation and memory of war by 
veterans. The shaping and transmission of war’s memory is performed largely by veterans 
who constitute a mnemonic community [more about this, later]. However, my 
methodology also borrows much of its conceptual vocabulary from media studies and 
discourse analysis for its interrogation of articles, newspaper reports, reviews, blogs, and 
so on. And its appraisal of the secondary literature of the ‘Border War’ is supplemented 
                                                          
24 M. Edele, Soviet Veterans of the Second World War: A Popular Movement in an Authoritarian Society, 
1941-1991 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).  
25 N. Tumarkin, The Living & the Dead. The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World War II in Russia (New 
York: BasicBooks, 1994); A. Weiner, Making Sense of War:The Second World War and the Fate of the 
Bolshevik Revolution (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001); L. Kirschenbaum, The 
Legacy of the Siege of Leningrad, 1941-1995. Myth, Memories, and Monuments (Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); D. Youngblood, Russian War Films:On the Cinema Front, 
1914-2005 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007). 
26 R. Dale, Demobilized Veterans in Late Stalinist Leningrad: Soldiers to Civilians.(London: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2015); V. Davis, Myth Making in the Soviet Union and Modern Russia:Remembering World 




by tried and tested historical methods such as archival research, oral interviews and an 
analysis of primary sources. In short, my approach is unashamedly eclectic. 
 
[Grace Huxford]: And perhaps veterans’ history is at its strongest with such a broad 
methodological approach, addressing again the many sub-fields that underpin it. But I 
wonder if twentieth-century veterans as historical actors are unique in the sheer amount 
of historical traces they leave behind? Certainly in the British case, modern veterans are 
by comparison with previous generations, highly literate and create an astonishing range 
of ego-documents in addition to organisational or state-created documents.27 But the 
definition of the ‘veteran’ also seems crucial to these methodological considerations too. 
Can veterans be seen as coherent and well-defined historical actors? If so, what 
characterizes them historically? 
 
[Olivier Burtin]: The short answer is that veterans are characterized by the fact that they 
share a common experience of war. But I would quickly add several caveats to this 
definition.  
 First and most important, their experience is always mediated by other factors 
such as class, race, gender, disability, generation, religion, and so on. Veterans of different 
wars, and sometimes even of the same war, do not necessarily identify with each other. 
The highly diverse patchwork of veterans’ groups that exist in countries such as the U.S. 
– from the Disabled American Veterans to the Jewish War Veterans to the Iraq and 
Afghanistan War Veterans – belies any claim of a monolithic ‘veteran community’. 
However, this does not mean that we should see veterans as less ‘coherent and well-
defined actors’ than other groups, for they are not the only ones to experience these kinds 
of internal divides. It simply means that veterans do not speak with one voice – just like 
women, workers, or Asian-Americans.  
Second, the answer to the question of who qualifies as a ‘veteran’ changes across 
time and space, especially in a legal sense. In the U.S., for instance, the term currently 
applies to anyone having served in the military for a minimum period of time regardless 
of whether they saw combat, whereas in the UK it is reserved to those having served in 
                                                          
27 D. Vincent, The Rise of Mass Literacy: Reading and Writing in Modern Europe (Cambridge: Polity, 




military operations.28 Even though the experience of someone having served in an office 
in Washington, D.C., will be very different from that of someone having been deployed 
for combat on the frontlines, they will both qualify as ‘veteran’ in the US. In other words, 
there is nothing self-evident about being a veteran: it is a historically constructed 
category, which can be more or less inclusive depending on a country’s specific 
experience of war. 
Third and last, veterans do not necessarily have a monopoly on the war 
experience. Depending on the conflict, other groups may also claim to have “been 
through” war (think of Londoners during the Blitz, for instance).The difference is that 
veterans were typically enlisted in a military organization, as opposed to merely being 
civilians engulfed in war (though again, this is not always true). This distinction between 
veterans and war-affected civilians is noteworthy, because it often plays a key role in 
determining the situation of the former group after war’s end. To make a crude but useful 
generalization, it is possible to say that the more veterans have a credible claim to being 
the only group affected by war, the more they will be able to obtain generous benefits 
from the state and to enjoy a superior social and cultural status—which makes sense, 
since feelings of moral obligation towards them will naturally be higher. We can see this, 
for instance, by comparing the US with the UK during and after the Second World War: 
the fact that British civilians greatly suffered from this war, while American ones were 
largely out of harm’s way, helps explain why the special benefits granted US veterans 
were so much more generous (with the 1944 G.I. Bill of Rights, for instance) than those 
received by their British counterparts.   
 
[Grace Huxford]: In addition to a common experience of war, I would add that veterans 
have a common experience of the aftermath of war too. In the case of British veterans of 
the Korean War, it is not remembering, but forgetting that binds veterans together.29 This 
social experience brings the group together and constitutes a major part of their veteran 
identity. So I would argue that memory (or its absence) too makes veterans into a more 
coherent historical grouping. I think it is also important to acknowledge that 
‘veteranhood’ is potentially a time and age-specific identity for individuals too. Hunt 
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writes that in many modern conflicts, veterans only seek one another out in old age, as 
they do not associate with the term ‘veteran’ until after retirement.30 For example, many 
British national service conscripts of the late 1940s and 1950s did not see themselves as 
veterans after their military service, as they left in their early twenties. Does that mean 
that age is a particularly important characteristic in defining the veteran culturally or on 
an individual level?  
 
[Gary Baines]: I have to agree with Olivier that the veteran is a politically and socially 
constructed category. In post-apartheid South Africa, for instance, the issue of defining 
who qualifies as a veteran is contentious. There is more at stake than semantics as 
definitions are linked to access to limited resources, economic opportunities and the 
construction of collective memory. Ex-combatants from the liberation armies, in 
particular, have a vested interest in being accorded veteran status. It promised, but did not 
necessarily deliver, a position in the newly-integrated South African National Defence 
Force (SANDF). Secondly, it made them eligible for certain benefits in terms of recently-
enacted legislation pertaining to military veterans. Former members of the SADF, 
including conscripts, might not have quite the same financial stake in the matter but many 
attach significant value to their identity and status as veterans. 
Whereas the definition of military veteran may be determined in law, identity is 
constructed by the self in relation to a specific veteran community. I think that we need 
to address the question of extent (if any) to which militarised identities linger beyond the 
return to civilian life. In other words, can we speak about residual militarised identities 
in veterans? In my aforementioned book, I illustrate how SADF veterans’ thought 
processes and speech patterns reveal the ongoing impact of military training and 
discourse. The loyalty to the fighting unit and shared experience of military engagement 
seemed to have created a sense of camaraderie that outlasted demobilisation and the 
existence of the SADF. And for some veterans the experience of combat was exhilarating, 
even life-affirming and transformative, and has come to define who they are. But this is 
not true of all veterans. Indeed, some resent the indoctrination to which they were 
subjected in a hyper-masculinised military environment and having to defend a 
discredited ideology and illegitimate regime. So SADF veterans are not a homogeneous 
group and their postwar identities have only been partially fashioned by their military 
                                                          




experience. And, of course, they have little in common with the (surviving) South African 
veterans of the Second World War even though they might belong to the same veterans’ 
associations. For, one thing, they comprise two different age groups or generations. For 
another, those who served in the Union Defence Force (UDF) and went to war against 
Germany were volunteers, whereas the vast majority of those who were deployed in the 
‘Border War’ were national servicemen (i.e. conscripts). 
 
[Ángel Alcalde]:  I think this conceptual issue is crucial. My answer would be no, veterans 
are not a coherent set of historical actors, but I do have a number of reservations. As 
historians such as Mark Edele and Martin Crotty have argued, all veterans in very 
different parts of the world and in different periods have shared some characteristics, 
presumably a ‘sense of entitlement’. An anthropological perspective also allows us to 
approach all ex-soldiers as individuals shaped by the war experience. At the same time, I 
agree with the notion that the ‘veteran’ is constructed in a number of ways: defined by 
legislation, by culture and discourse, by politics, etc. In my view, one of the most 
interesting tasks is to analyse the processes by which notions of ‘veteran’ were 
constructed. Moreover, I would say that veterans’ history cannot be restricted to the study 
of veterans as actors, but must embrace also the analysis of institutions, discourses, 
ideologies and practices that contributed to construct and re-construct the very notion of 
‘veteran’. Approaching the ‘veteran’ as a culturally constructed symbol, rather than as a 
strictly delimited actor, allows us to understand phenomena such as the emergence of 
stereotypes about veterans and their utilization by other historical actors. Thus, attitudes 
and strategies such as ‘veteranizing’ (publicly posing and acting as a veteran is expected 
to do), as James Marten describes it,31 become meaningful in historical narratives. 
 
[Mark Edele]: There is no universal answer to this empirical question: it requires concrete 
answers for concrete cases. Nevertheless, there are some patterns. A central question 
which always arises is who counts as a veteran and who does not. This problematic is 
particularly acute in situations where there are multiple and overlapping wars (the Russian 
and Soviet empires after both World Wars; China after the Second World War), and 
where the distinction between front and hinterland is blurry (as in situations of total war, 
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civil war, or occupation and resistance to it).32 More generally there are nearly always 
struggles about who gets included in the group, who not, and why. Do you have to have 
seen combat, for example, to count as a veteran? Do you have to have fought in uniform, 
or can you qualify if you served as an irregular? There are always debates about these 
boundaries, both among veterans themselves, among legislators producing legal 
definitions, and among those who implement whatever legislation exists.  
 
[Grace Huxford]: Following on from that, how different are war veterans from each 
other? And given the varied experiences of veterans after war, what determines their 
socio-political agency in that context? 
 
[Mark Edele]: Again, this is an empirical question. Some veterans are more alike than 
others – Australian ANZACs, to use one extreme example, were much a more coherent 
group in terms of age and social background than, say, veterans of the multi-national, 
multi-generational, multi-class, and gender-inclusive Red Army in the Second World 
War, to return to my favorite example.33 The level of social, generational, gender, and 
national differences within a given veteran population depends on the individual case in 
question. The extent to which they gain collective agency after the war, likewise, depends 
on the society they return to, the kind of war they have fought, and the politics of post-
war life. These have to be all untangled for each individual case.  
Generally, I have become wary of attempts at predicting outcomes for veterans, 
partially because I have tried, together with Martin Crotty, to construct a matrix of 
variables to do so.34 It is still a useful road-map, but things quickly unravel once you 
move beyond two-case comparisons, of which there are some but not nearly enough.35 
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You will be able to find counter-examples to nearly any conceivable scenario, as we 
continue to learn in our ongoing project of multi-national comparison. In the final 
analysis, whether or not veterans find a common voice, acquire a special status, and 
become influential in post-war life is a political question. And in politics, you can lose 
even if you have the most favourable conditions. But you can also do well despite an 
unfavourable context. Historians can reconstruct the histories of such outcomes, but we 
will not be able to predict them. 
 
[Ángel Alcalde]: As long as previous background and war experiences differ, veterans 
behave differently after their war experience. Then, I think the processes by which 
different notions of veteranhood are constructed clearly shape their agency. It was not the 
same to reintegrate as a defeated veteran into German society after 1945 – where veteran 
organizations were initially banned, as returning to the victorious United States as part of 
what subsequent writers have called the ‘Greatest Generation’. 
 
[Mark Edele]: And yet, very soon the defeated veterans of Hitler's army did rather well 
in the Federal Republic of Germany, particularly after they had convinced themselves 
and others that they were victims of war rather than its perpetrators.36 Indeed, if we 
change the comparator, a quite different story emerges, from the one suggested by the 
example of the GI Bill of Rights. Thus, while the West German state legalized veteran 
organizations and instituted a fairly generous welfare system for returned soldiers who 
had lost a criminal war,37 in the Soviet Union, the veterans who had saved Europe from 
Nazism and Stalin's state from obliteration saw their benefits dismantled and their efforts 
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at organization blocked.38 So what matters is not victory or defeat, but the post-war 
political context, and the outcome of post-war political struggles.  
 
[Grace Huxford]: Coming back to the previous question, to some extent, the division 
between those who have experienced war and those who have not is stronger than that 
between veterans. This is often associated with what Yuval Harari labels ‘flesh-
witnessing’: the belief that those who felt the discomfort and sensory elements of military 
experience have a distinct experience of warfare.39  So I think that is where the most 
obvious distinctions are drawn. However, throughout the twentieth century, we do see 
current service personnel reflecting on past exploits of veterans. Kevin Foster, for 
instance, has shown how George Orwell, fighting in Spain in 1936, always has one eye 
on the First World War generation that preceded him.40 So I think there is certainly more 
to be said about how serving soldiers view veterans and differentiate themselves from 
their past heroics. The second part of this question is particularly interesting in cases 
where veterans have struggled to obtain agency or ‘voice’. Collective grievances are 
important in determining that struggle for agency: for example, Clare Makepeace has 
charted how former British Far East Prisoners of War (FEPOWs) successfully lobbied 
for compensation from the Japanese in 1951.41 In the case of national service conscripts 
in Britain, perceived injustices over pensions have been particularly important in 
mobilising veterans around a common cause. Once again, it comes back to comparison 
though, as these veterans looked back to the past experiences of previous generations of 
service personnel and their treatment by the state in comparison to themselves. 
 
[Gary Baines]: By way of answering this question, I wish to pick up on Olivier’s earlier 
point that veterans do not necessarily have a monopoly on the war experience. This is 
certainly true. Civilians have been affected by war throughout the twentieth century. But 
it is worth noting that many veterans believe that their experiential knowledge of war – 
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my restatement of Harari’s concept of ‘flesh witnessing’ that Grace mentions above – 
entitles them to ownership of the narrative of any given war. This claim is typically 
expressed by way of the soldiers' mantra: ‘We were there’. Veterans almost always 
reckon that their experience affords them a privileged understanding of war. The corollary 
is that commentators uninitiated in combat and armchair critics (including scholars) who 
have conducted research from their ivory towers are dismissed with the injunction: ‘How 
can you understand? … You were not there.’ This amounts to an assertion that the 
authority of the soldiers’ witness can and should not be challenged. Following Stéphane 
Audoin-Rousseau and Annette Becker,42 I would argue that first-hand experience or 
knowledge alone does not entitle veterans to speak about war. Conversely, a lack thereof 
does not disqualify the historian from doing so. We must reject the notion of a closed and 
self-fulfilling circle of understanding and truth. So I am cognisant of the fact that as an 
historian and a veteran, that mine is far from the last word on war but that my dual identity 
enables a multi-perspectival approach to the ‘Border War’. 
 
[Grace Huxford]: A lot of our answers so far have obliquely referred to veterans’ 
collective identity, which is an important area to analyse in greater detail. So, beginning 
with veterans’ associations, are they a useful window to approach veterans as a whole? 
 
[Olivier Burtin]: Veterans’ groups are a very useful window into veterans’ history: they 
provide us with insights into how veterans related both to each other and to the larger 
civilian population. At the same time, we should keep in mind that they are not necessarily 
representative of the larger veteran community. This is not surprising: after all, veterans’ 
groups typically account for only a fraction of the total veteran population.43 As I have 
said before, these groups also often advocate for one specific sub-group of veterans—
defined by their disability, race, gender, or else—and therefore should not be construed 
to speak for all former soldiers. Neither do they necessarily speak even for all their 
members: as can happen in any large organization, the leadership of veterans’ groups may 
fall into the hands of a small minority of committed activists whose interests do not align 
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with those of the majority of their membership (they may be more conservative and 
respectful of the status quo, for instance). 
 
[Grace Huxford]: From an oral history perspective, veterans’ associations are vital both 
practically and historically. From a practical perspective, they often act as ‘gatekeepers’ 
who can provide access to veterans and helpful support in contacting members. More 
historically, their formation and character are vital in understanding the post-memory of 
conflict: the formation of the British Korea Veterans Association (BKVA) in the 1980s 
is a fascinating insight into the evolving memory of the conflict. But we should be aware 
of those who do not identify with or take part in this associational culture.  
 
[Mark Edele]: Yes, veterans’ associations are important foci of research for historians of 
veterans, but we need to avoid conflating them with veterans as a whole. For one, we 
need to ask what share of veterans are actually organized. Secondly, we need to find out 
what share of these organized veterans then are active in the organizations and hence 
make their voice heard. Do certain veterans not join organizations? Why do they join or 
why do then not? These are all empirical questions with diverse answers, depending on 
the cases we investigate. And they are sometimes surprisingly hard to answer with any 
level of certainty. 
 
[Ángel Alcalde]: I would agree that one should not confuse veterans as a whole with the 
community of associations’ members. Historians should be extremely wary of 
generalizing assertions such as ‘veterans supported the government’, just because the 
hegemonic veteran organization in that country stated loyalty to the authorities. Processes 
by which certain groups of individuals are prevented from joining veteran associations 
are precisely an important part of veterans’ history. But in modern history, associations 
are still crucial in observing veterans’ history, at least in societies where such sociability 
exists. We should not forget, nonetheless, the history of veterans in regions of the world 
where associative life was much more limited (such as former regions of the British and 




the 1940s).44 State-run veterans’ organizations are something different to veterans’ 
associations. 
 
[Gary Baines]: While I agree that the study of formal veterans’ associations is instructive 
for understanding their part in politicking and the dynamics between groups, Winter has 
noted that at the interface of formal organizations of civil society and informal networks 
of family and kin there exist what he has termed ‘fictive kinships’ such as veteran 
networks.45 Such networks operate in the ‘real world’, as well as in cyberspace. Indeed, I 
discovered that SADF veterans employ social media to tell their stories and so cultivate 
a sense of belonging to a (defunct) institution and an imagined white nation. Their 
withdrawal from the public sphere results in their retreat into private enclaves or 
discursive laagers. Here they converse with family members in the home, or with friends 
around the outdoor ritual of the braai (barbecue), or with white compatriots and 
expatriates in ‘virtual pubs’ (i.e. internet forums such as chat rooms). These closed 
communities simulate a different time and reality, and create the space for the 
performance and rehearsal of nostalgia. Such self-segregated socialisation fosters the 
construction of a mnemonic community that share group or collective memories. There 
is evidence to suggest that US veterans of the Vietnam War engage in similar activities. 
So while I cannot generalise about this development, these observations might have a 
wider relevance to our understanding of the collective identities of veterans. 
 
[Olivier Burtin]: To stimulate our debate on veterans’ collective identity, I’d like to 
approach the issue from a slightly different and more provocative angle. Is it possible for 
historians to examine military veterans in the same way that E. P. Thompson looked at 
English workers, as a separate ‘class’? 46 What are some of the factors that contribute to 
the formation of a distinct class consciousness among veterans? In what ways are veterans 
different from (or similar to) other classes such as workers, small businessmen, 
professionals, etc.? 
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[Ángel Alcalde]: The concept of ‘class’ has specific economic and material connotations, 
and in this sense I believe it is very difficult to observe war veterans as a separate group 
– separated from other classes – because the variety of socio-economic and material 
circumstances that characterize them is huge. So, I do not think observing veterans as a 
‘class’ is useful. What is illuminating is realizing how veterans as historical actors 
sometimes perceived themselves as a single ‘class’. It is true that demobilized veterans 
often felt threatened in socio-economic terms. Historian Bruno Cabanes, exploring First 
World War veterans’ demobilization, has suggested the idea of a ‘moral economy of 
demobilization’ (an idea that directly relates to Thompson).47 Veterans may widely share 
economic or material interests, such as obtaining pensions. However, there were always 
huge differences in social and economic status between officers and soldiers. After the 
First World War, socialists and communists often tried to approach veterans by making 
a distinction between proletarian soldiers and bourgeois officers. Antonio Gramsci even 
wrote about the revolutionary role veterans should have.48 
In my view, as Antoine Prost argued, it is difficult to equate veterans to workers 
or any other ‘social class’. I prefer to talk about veteran identity, rather than class. 
Historically, some veterans developed a strong awareness of forming a distinct group that 
cut across social and national boundaries. On occasions it was said, ‘Veterans of the 
world, unite!’ However, these projects often had the purpose of concealing or dissolving 
much clearer socio-economic differences. European fascists, for instance, gave more 
prominence to the community of the war experience while condemning the class struggle. 
In short, although historical actors sometimes viewed veterans as a separate class, 
historians should not fall into the same trap. 
 
[Gary Baines]: I am of the view that age and generational distinctions are more useful 
when it comes to disaggregating veterans. The cohort of white males conscripted into the 
SADF between 1966 and 1989 has been called the national service generation (NSG). 
Generation here does not signify the co-existence of similarly aged people as much as it 
denotes their sense of belonging to a group with a shared historical consciousness.49 
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Personal narratives fashion the macrobiography of a generation and, conversely, the 
generational macrobiography produces a shared consciousness that shapes the personal 
narratives.50 Thus there is mediation between personal memories and those of the 
generational unit. Although conscripts were all white males of a similar age, they came 
from a cross-section of society and responded in a variety of ways to their military 
experience. Some were career soldiers but most were conscripts. So I do not presume that 
the veteran community speaks with a singular, coherent voice.51 
 
[Olivier Burtin]: As I said, I used this comparison mostly to provoke discussion: of 
course, I recognize that war veterans are not a ‘class’ in the strict Marxian sense of the 
word, as referring to a group of individuals sharing a similar relationship to the means of 
production. As we’ve said before, veterans are not defined primarily in economic terms 
but by their shared experience of military conflict. Where I think that Thompson’s 
approach can be useful, though, is in getting us to see the concept of ‘class’ in a broader 
sense, as referring to a group of persons conscious of sharing common material interests 
that distinguish them from the rest of society and engaging in collective action to advance 
the same. Veterans can sometimes fall into that category. For instance, in my own 
research on veterans’ politics in the mid-twentieth century U.S., I have found interesting 
evidence that some factors encouraged the growth of a class consciousness among former 
soldiers. Veterans who felt most different from civilianstended to be older, to be active 
members of a veterans’ organization, to draw some form of veterans’ benefits, and to 
have a lower economic or educational status.52 While we should of course be cautious in 
applying these results to other periods and places, they do point to a simple yet interesting 
observation: that individuals tend to define themselves as veterans when they need the 
benefits associated with this status the most—which ties into what Grace said at the 
beginning of our roundtable about the role of age. Going a step further, this suggests a 
causal link between public policy and identity formation: the prior existence of material 
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benefits associated with that status can encourage veterans to self-consciously identify 
and organize as such. Political scientists are familiar with this dynamic: Andrea Louise 
Campbell, for instance, has shown how the creation of Social Security in the U.S. led to 
the rise of the elderly as a powerful interest group (and not the other way around, as one 
might have thought).53 The same could be said for veterans’ pension programs: their 
existence tends to encourage veterans to mobilize as a separate group to defend them. The 
broader point here is that the process of class formation (again, I’m using this term 
loosely) is not only inherently political but historically constructed and contingent. As E. 
P. Thompson demonstrated for the English working class, veterans both make themselves 
and are made into a class. 
 
[Mark Edele]: I agree with Ángel that veterans cannot be understood as a social class in 
either a Marxist (including Thompsonian) or a Weberian understanding of the term. They 
are neither a group with an approximately similar position vis-à-vis the means of 
production, nor are they a group with an approximately even distribution of life chances. 
Nevertheless, as Olivier observes, the question of whether or not veterans form a social 
group is central to any social history of veterans. Some have used ‘identity’ to describe 
such groupness, but this term is a bit too fuzzy for our purposes.54 My own attempts to 
find a way to talk about the social cohesion and social action of veterans led to two terms: 
‘status group’ and ‘entitlement group’. The first I took directly from Max Weber, who 
has developed a clearly articulated distinction between status and class. If a class is a 
group of people who share similar cultural, social, and material resources, a status group 
shares a special esteem by members of the larger social formation. This esteem is 
expressed in special privileges, in modern societies often institutionalized in law.55 The 
problem was that in the Soviet case before 1978 veterans did not really form a status 
group – there were no laws giving them preferential access to goods and services and 
until 1956 there was not even a legal organization representing their interests (outside 
Ukraine, which formed something of an anomaly for a while). Nevertheless, veterans 
often acted in concert, driven by a shared sense that on the basis of their wartime sacrifice 
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they were entitled to better treatment than they received.56 I called this an ‘entitlement 
group’.57  
This choice of words has proved somewhat confusing to some readers. In English 
‘entitlement’ can be used as a synonym for ‘status’, while I meant to distinguish claims 
to special treatment from their institutionalization. What I tried to capture is that in the 
Soviet case the sense of entitlement they shared allowed veterans to act in concert even 
if they did not have an organization or arguably even did not share a sense of identity as 
veterans (an ‘imagined community’, to use another overused term). Eventually, and for 
fairly complex contextual reasons, this uncoordinated mass movement was successful 
and a legal status was instituted in 1978: the entitlement community had become a status 
group.58 
These terms were originally developed for the Soviet context, where greater 
restrictions on self-organization and expression applied than in democratic contexts, but 
they also proved productive for our comparative work. The biggest conceptual issue we 
are struggling with in our multi-national comparison at the moment is one particular 
aspect of status which I had neglected somewhat in my earlier work: the fact that the 
immediate community the veterans are embedded in might recognize their special status 
even if the state does not (as was often the case in the Soviet Union). Or the locals might 
scoff at veterans despite the fact that there was state discourse honouring them (as was 
sometimes the case in China). We try to capture this distinction by the terms ‘horizontal’ 
and ‘vertical’ status.59 
 
[Grace Huxford]: Although many of our examples have spanned the twentieth century, 
the post-1945 period clearly raises particular questions in veterans’ history. Compared to 
previous time periods, what do you think were some of the distinguishing features of post-
1945 veteranhood? 
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[Ángel Alcalde]: In Western countries there was a clear evolution in veterans’ affairs after 
1945. Sometimes historians compare the history of veterans after the First and Second 
World Wars, by taking these two different periods as self-contained and hermetically 
separated periods. Of course, there are differences and similarities between the situation 
of veterans in these periods. However, one cannot disregard the very obvious fact that the 
second post-war period came after the first. There is a historical continuity. In this sense, 
in 1945 historical actors were acutely aware of how veterans had been treated, and how 
they had behaved, in earlier times. There was, therefore, a process of learning. In the 
realm of international veterans’ organizations, there were important differences in the 
political language employed, on the one hand, by FIDAC and CIAMAC in the interwar 
period and, on the other hand, the one put forward by the World Veterans Federation after 
its creation in 1950. The failure of FIDAC and CIAMAC in preventing a new war was a 
bitter lesson learnt by peace-oriented veterans in the period after the Second World War. 
Policymakers dealing with veterans’ demobilization after 1945 also tried not to repeat the 
errors committed after 1918. The GI Bill and the splendid privileges American veterans 
enjoyed after 1945 cannot be understood without taking into account interwar veterans’ 
protest movements. The work of historian Stephen Ortiz shows clearly this continuity.60 
There were also important technical improvements that eased disabled veterans’ 
rehabilitation. So, probably it was easier to be a veteran in some post-1945 societies than 
after 1918. But the situation of veterans dramatically changed from one country to 
another, at least in Europe. As regards to the rest of the world, post-colonial countries for 
instance, veterans’ issues also changed substantially after 1945, given the decolonization 
context. This is still a topic that needs to be investigated. 
 I would also add another point: 1945 was certainly a watershed in veterans’ 
history, but I think another important watershed was Vietnam. The Vietnam War 
dramatically changed Western perceptions of veterans as political and social actors. New 
realities and stereotypes emerged, in connection with anti-war and pacifist movements. 
After that, the experience of being a veteran also changed. Historicizing all these 
processes of change from a long-term perspective is something that partially remains to 
be done. 
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[Olivier Burtin]: In the US, I can see at least three things that distinguish the post-1945 
years from earlier periods. First, the historically high proportion of former soldiers in the 
total population, higher than even after the Civil War (13 per cent in 1950 compared to 8 
per cent in the late nineteenth century). Second, the prestige that their associations 
enjoyed, at least for a time. In the aftermath of the Second World War, groups like the 
American Legion or the Veterans of Foreign Wars were among the most important mass-
membership associations in American politics, as influential as labor unions or religious 
denominations. Third, this was the first time that the U.S. federal government tried to 
help able-bodied veterans readjust to civilian life (with the 1944 G.I. Bill of Rights), as 
opposed to just taking care of disabled veterans or rewarding them with programs such 
as land grants.  
 
[Grace Huxford]: In the British case, the post-1945 period is one of ambiguity, in terms 
of both terminology and status. The establishment of peacetime military conscription 
between 1948 and 1960 also problematized who was seen as a ‘veteran’ in this period. 
I’d also argue that this is a period of important linguistic change too: as Nigel Hunt notes, 
the ‘creation’ of PTSD in 1980 as a medical disorder gave a new lexicon for 
understanding veteran experience.61 These frameworks persist through the present-day 
and pervade many cultural representations of military life.  
 
[Mark Edele]: In much of the developed world, after 1945 fighting in war became a 
minority experience. The end of mass mobilization and the rise of more restrictive war 
making widened the gap between veterans and civilians. This statement should hold true 
for Europe, the Soviet Union and its successor states, the United States, Australia, and 
eventually also China. The same can probably not be said for civil wars in Asia, Africa, 
and now the Arab world.  
As far as the Soviet Union was concerned, the context of the immediate post-war 
years was fairly similar after both World Wars. It was not easier to be a veteran in the 
1940s than in the 1920s. Eventually, however, once the veterans of the Great Patriotic 
War had won a special status, their position overshadowed all other former soldiers. The 
veterans of the wars in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and now eastern Ukraine never managed 
                                                          




to get similar recognition.62 Vietnam did not mark any change in the Soviet context, 
although Afghanistan is sometimes treated as the 'Soviet Vietnam', and could be used to 
construct an analogous story.63 
 
[Gary Baines]: I agree with Ángel that the Vietnam War represented a watershed in 
veterans’ history – not only for the USA but for other nations, too. The reception and 
treatment of US veterans following Vietnam was vastly different to their counterparts 
who had fought in the Second World War. Veterans of the Second World War came to 
be called the ‘Greatest Generation’ precisely because the American public was uneasy 
about the manner in which their soldiers had fought (or not) in Vietnam and comparisons 
between these generations of veterans reflected poorly on the latter. But equally important 
was the inclusion of PTSD in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM III) in 1980. 
The American historian Jerry Lembcke has argued that PTSD is a socially constructed 
category whose meaning is only partly derived from its medical context, and that it has 
mutated from a diagnostic category to a social trope. He contends that the seductiveness 
of PTSD caused some US veterans to embrace it as an identity and their comrades to 
assign it as a badge of honour.64 Accordingly, they were viewed not only as ‘victims’ but 
as ‘heroes’. This badge was worn by those who were said to have fought hard and 
experienced “real” war. PTSD was no longer regarded as a mark of failed masculinity but 
rather that of the brave soldier who had been on the frontline in perhaps the ultimate 
display of typically heteronormative masculinity. Whether victims or heroes, returning 
soldiers appropriated the symptoms of PTSD and a war-story biography that conformed 
to what they thought family and friends would expect to see and hear.65 Lembcke’s 
argument has a degree of resonance in post-apartheid South Africa where SADF veterans 
have readily self-diagnosed themselves with the symptoms of PTSD and claimed 
victimhood. 
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[Grace Huxford]: Gary’s point touches on a theme that has underpinned many of our 
answers: the cultural memory of war. My final question is then: how do veterans and 
veteran groups interact with or shape the collective memory of post-1945 conflict? I pose 
this question because in my work I have explored the relationship between collective 
memory and autobiographical memory, a familiar area to many of us. Alistair Thomson’s 
work on Australian veterans has been particularly notable here, showing how veterans’ 
memories can be shaped by the collective imperatives at the time of an oral history 
interview.66 In the case of the Korean War, the Second World War shapes many veterans’ 
viewpoints over their lack of remembrance, but so too do later wars such as the Falklands. 
It is also important to consider the role of veterans in creating collective memory. Are 
veterans part of national stories of warfare or excluded from them? In Europe, the passing 
of the First World War generation has led to evermore ingenious ways of remembering, 
but the voice of the veteran is now, unavoidably, fixed into a particular narrative. Can 
veterans’ voices subvert these narratives though?  
 
[Ángel Alcalde]: As the tragedies of the Second World War were directly experienced by 
civilian populations, combat veterans were not any longer the main social group that felt 
entitled to shape the memory of war. The distinctions between those who had fought and 
those who had not were much more blurred after 1945. The number of persons actually 
involved in combat substantially decreased in western societies, so as time passed, the 
role of veterans in shaping war memory lost prominence. Meanwhile, victims of war 
gained visibility. Veterans sometimes challenge these narratives, but the centrality of 
victimhood probably made veterans cultivate their own memories in an increasingly 
autonomous way. 
 
[Olivier Burtin]: In the U.S., veterans’ groups played an active role in shaping the 
memory of war (as they had since long before the Second World War). They contributed 
to raising funds for war cemeteries and memorials both at home and abroad; played a 
leading role in commemorating annual celebrations like Memorial Day or Veterans’ Day; 
tried to encourage the teaching of a certain version of American history in schools; 
censored public speakers who tried to promote a more radical view of history; and 
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organized pilgrimages to former battlegrounds in Europe, as a way both for their members 
to visit places they had been to during the war, and to build partnerships with other 
veterans’ groups abroad.  
 
[Gary Baines]: At this point, I would merely wish to return to the concept of mnemonic 
community which is a useful vehicle for understanding veteran agency in shaping and 
disseminating memories of their war. Collective memories do not arise spontaneously nor 
take shape independently of such agency. They are born and shaped by agents, whom we 
might call “memory makers” or “memory bearers”, that include cultural brokers, public 
intellectuals, teachers, and politicians who are instrumental in the public construction of 
memory. They select, modify, negotiate and reify particular versions of the past. These 
agents employ the cultural tools of language and narratives to make meaning. These 
interpretative codes play a significant part in shaping the views of the past and present 
that bind the members of a mnemonic community together. They comprise two elements: 
the schemata, the temporal narrative structure in which individuals construe their 
memory, and the script, which is composed of existing preconceptions and opinions on 
issues that pertain to the memory in question.67 Individuals learn to conventionalize, 
structure and narrativize their memories in accordance with the dominant social mores 
and beliefs which prevail in the individual’s different mnemonic communities.68 They 
relate to the group’s shared experiences and memories, commonalities from which 
identities and narratives are constructed that articulate the individual’s self-perception in 
relation to others. Such constructions are, in turn, contingent upon the reactions of the 
dominant socio-cultural group towards its manifestations. I believe that this paradigm 
might be useful in understanding the development of collective memories wherever 
military veterans might have access to (social) media and the public sphere. 
 
[Grace Huxford]: As we bring our discussion to a close, I am struck by the vibrancy of 
the field of veterans’ history, not just in the diverse case studies referenced by our 
discussants, but in the wider methodological or theoretical interventions that can be made 
through it: it encompasses the potentials and pitfalls of comparative history-writing, the 
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search for suitably inclusive models of collectivity, and the shifting societal and linguistic 
assumptions that underpin labels such as ‘veteran’. Although our discussants have voiced 
a range of opinions that might inform our examination and conceptualisation of the 
veteran, the discussion nevertheless demonstrates the promise that veterans’ history holds 
as a tool through which analyse the changing relationship between war and society in the 
twentieth century.  
 
